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borrowing costs. We show that the market for syndicated loans is a “small world” characterized by 
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better information and resources flows between banks thus enhancing their social capital. We then 
show that lenders’ experience and reputation play a significant role in reducing loan spreads and 
thus increasing borrower’s wealth. 
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A syndicated loan is granted by a pool of banks that provide funding to a borrower under a single 
agreement and lies at the crossroads of relationship and transaction lending (Dennis and Mullineaux 
2000). In 2009, more than 1.5 trillion USD of debt has been raised on the worldwide syndicated 
lending market, representing one third of  external  financing for companies  (Thomson Financial 
2009). The benefits of loan syndication both for lenders (portfolio risk and sources of revenues 
diversification) and borrowers (mostly lower costs as compared to bond issues or a series of bilateral 
loans) largely explain the success of syndicated lending. However, syndicated loans have their 
drawbacks because the organization of a syndicate of banks may expose its members to the adverse 
consequences of informational frictions and potential agency costs. 
Important features of syndicates that gain in recent academic interest for their potential 
mitigation effect of agency costs are lenders’ experience and reputation. Indeed, as the arrangers are 
responsible for due diligence, allocation of the loan to other syndicate members, and ex post 
monitoring, banks in the syndicate will often rely on the leaders’ reputation in making  lending 
decisions (Ross 2010). Hence, reputable and experienced leaders can enhance monitoring and the 
ability to attract participants, help show the quality of the borrower and the deal, and reduce agency 
costs (Gatti et al. 2008; Panyagometh and Roberts 2010). 
Lender’s experience and reputation are closely related to trust and reciprocity  which 
represent critical forms of social capital (Song 2009), in particular for teams (Carpenter et al. 2009). 
Social capital can be considered as the foundation of every economic transaction because it enables 
exchange given that contracts are incomplete and allows transaction costs to be reduced (Arrow 
1974). Social networks are considered as fundamental drivers of social capital (Di Cagno and Sciubba 
2010) and syndicated lending market bears several social network features because it serves as an 
information network which allows the acquisition of private information on borrowers’ quality and as 
a capital network which allows the raising of the necessary funding of loans (Baum, Shipilov, and 
Rowley 2003; Baum, Rowley, and Shipilov 2004; Morrison and Wilhelm 2007). Moreover, recent 
empirical evidence by Champagne and Kryzanowski (2007), Cai (2010), and Cai, Saunders, and Steffen 
(2010) show that collaboration and reciprocity are important features of bank loan syndication as 
reciprocal arrangements among syndicate arrangers appear to be a very common practice leading to 
choose banks having similar lending expertise. 
In this article, we provide an in depth empirical investigation of the role of syndicate lenders’ 
experience and reputation for loan syndication using social network analysis. We first analyze the 
small world properties of the syndicated lending market. A small world is a locally dense social 
network where social distances between actors are short. Such a network improves market efficiency 3 
 
as it allows larger information and resource flows. It can also develop reciprocity and trust between 
lenders and thus enhance the formation of social capital, ultimately increasing lenders’ experience 
and reputation. Hence, syndicated lending small world may provide benefits in terms of resource 
procurement and the reduction of information asymmetry. This in turn can mitigate agency costs and 
lower borrowing costs. Thus, we evaluate the sensitivity of loan pricing to lenders’ experience and 
reputation, proxied by network centrality measures of banks. 
We contribute to the developing literature dealing with small world features of financial 
intermediation (Allen and Babus 2008), by providing an empirical description of the organization of 
the  syndicated lending market.  Such  a  “big picture” gives a better insight into the complex 
characteristics and dynamics of the interactions between lenders. We also contribute to the 
literature investigating the role of banks’ experience and reputation in financial transaction 
processing (Ross 2010), with a particular focus on their role in mitigating informational and agency 
costs stemming from the particular features of bank loan syndication. We thus provide additional 
empirical evidence on the impact of syndicate experience and reputation on borrowing costs and 
thus on borrower wealth. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. We describe the loan syndication process and 
its potential agency problems and survey relevant literature on social network analysis of financial 
intermediation in section 2. Section 3 is devoted to the description of data and of the social network 
analysis methodology. Results are displayed and discussed in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes 
the article. 
2. Syndicated lending and social networks 
This section is devoted to the description of the loan syndication process, the related agency costs 
and the role of lenders’ experience and reputation on the syndicated lending market. Then, we 
provide a survey of the  recent literature on social networks analysis applied to financial 
intermediation. 
2.1 Syndicated lending and agency costs 
The transaction process of bank loan syndication can be divided into three main stages
1
                                                            
1 See Esty (2001) for a detailed presentation of the bank loan syndication process. 
. During the 
pre-mandated stage, after soliciting competitive offers to arrange the syndication from one or more 
banks (usually the main relationship banks), the borrower chooses one or more arrangers that are 
mandated to form a syndicate and negotiates a preliminary loan agreement. The syndication can 
either involve a sole mandate or a joint one, the latter implying the participation of more than one 4 
 
lead bank. Such syndications are usually chosen by the borrower in order to maximize the chances of 
achieving the desired loan syndication. The arranger is responsible for negotiating the key loan terms 
with the borrower, appointing the participants and structuring the syndicate.  
During the post-mandated stage, the arranger prepares a documentation package - called an 
information memorandum -  for potential syndicate members, containing  information about the 
borrower's creditworthiness and the loan terms. The arranger largely determines the initial set of 
potential participants to target, and factors such as previous experience with the borrower and/or 
the arranger, in the industry sector or the geographic area, are strong drivers for being chosen by the 
arranger to join the syndicate. The presentation and discussion of the content of the information 
memorandum, as well as the announcement of closing fees and the establishment of a timetable for 
commitments and closing are done during a road show. Then, the arranger sends formal invitations 
to potential participants and determines the allocation for each participant. 
Finally, the operational post-signing stage takes place after the completion date when the 
deal becomes active and the loan is operational, binding the borrower and the syndicate members 
by the debt contract. 
The syndicated loan transaction process is heavily dependent upon the arrangers because of 
their pivotal role in structuring the deal, negotiating the terms of the loan agreement, and organizing 
the syndicate. However, the success of the syndication process is a function of negotiations and 
information flows between all the parties involved in the transaction: borrower, arrangers, and other 
syndicate members. Therefore, the fact that loan syndication involves several actors and is a complex 
process involves specific agency costs which can increase borrowing costs and thus are harmful for 
borrower’s wealth. 
First, private information about the borrower can create adverse selection problems, as the 
arranger may be inclined to syndicate loans for unreliable borrowers. However, such an opportunistic 
behavior can damage the arranger’s reputation, having a negative impact on the success of future 
syndications  (Pichler and Wilhelm 2001).  Hence, this “threat of reputation loss” can serve as a 
disciplining device of the arranger’s behavior. Second, participating banks may delegate monitoring 
to the arranger, but the banks are not in the loop as to what the arranger is doing, which might result 
in situations of moral hazard. In addition, the arranger has less incentive to monitor the borrower 
than if it were to lend the full amount of the loan (Pennachi 1998). Third, the borrower's financial 
distress is an important factor in syndication as it is more complicated to reorganize and reformulate 
the agreement for the borrower because a collective decision needs to be taken by the lenders 
(Bolton and Scharfstein 1996). 
Recent empirical evidence shows that adapting the organizational structure of a syndicate is 
a crucial feature in mitigating the agency costs of syndication which stem from the fact that different 5 
 
syndicate members have access to different degrees of information.  In particular, syndicate 
characteristics such as lenders’ interactions, experience, and reputation can mitigate syndication 
agency problems
2
Previous relationships between syndicate members can help to alleviate informational 
frictions and agency costs of syndication. Indeed, repeated interactions over time directly aim at 
solving problems of informational asymmetries because they create trust and reciprocity. Hence, 
prior relationships  between syndicate members have a significant impact on the probability of 
syndicating a  deal together  (Champagne and Kryzanowski 2007). These relationships are often 
reciprocal arrangements in the sense that lenders maintain stable relationships between them and 
rotate their roles in subsequent joint syndications (Cai 2010). Moreover, Cai, Saunders, and Steffen 
(2010) find that lead arrangers tend to choose participants having a close lending expertise in terms 
of borrower industry or geographic location. 
. 
Furthermore, as the arrangers are responsible for due diligence, allocation of the loan to 
other syndicate members, and ex post monitoring, banks in the syndicate will often rely on the 
leaders’ reputation in making lending decisions (Ross 2010). Therefore, reputation is an important 
aspect for syndicated lending (Gopalan, Nanda, and Yerramilli 2007), because reputable and 
experienced leaders can enhance monitoring and the ability to attract participants, help show the 
quality of the borrower and the deal, and reduce agency costs (Gatti et al. 2008; Panyagometh and 
Roberts 2010). Approval from experienced, reputable and prestigious arrangers actually creates 
economic value by reducing the overall costs of syndicated loans.  
Recent empirical evidence tends to conclude that loan pricing is sensitive to information 
costs of syndication (Focarelli, Pozzolo, and Casolaro 2008; Ivashina 2009) and lead banks reputation 
is found to be a crucial feature for the success of syndication but its impact on loan pricing is mixed. 
On  the  one hand, if lead banks’  reputation act as a certification device reducing adverse 
consequences of information asymmetry within the syndicate, loan spreads can be lower especially 
when informational frictions are expected to be severe (Gatti et al. 2008; Ross 2010). Regarding the 
foundation of experience or reputation, i.e. reciprocity, results provided by Cai (2010) also show that 
loans arranged in a reciprocal way are less costly for borrowers. Similar results are obtained by Cai, 
Saunders, and Steffen (2010) for syndicates composed of arrangers which are closer in terms of 
lending expertise. On the other hand, McCahery and Schwienbacher (2010) find that loans arranged 
                                                            
2 Other characteristics such as syndicate size and concentration also have an influence on agency costs (see 
Esty and W.L. Megginson 2003; Lee and Mullineaux 2004; Jones, Lang, and Nigro 2005; François and 
Missonnier-Piera 2007; Sufi 2007; Godlewski 2010).
3 We consider as lead banks syndicate members bearing the 
following titles:  administrative agent, agent, arranger, bookrunner, lead arranger, mandated arranger, senior 
arranger, underwriter, lead bank, joint arranger, managing agent, senior managing agent, syndication agent, 
co-agent, co-arranger, senior co-arranger, sub-underwriter, co-lead arranger, co-syndication agent, co-
underwriter. 6 
 
by reputable banks lead to higher loan spreads, especially for opaque borrowers  who pay a 
“reputation premium”. 
Lenders’ experience and reputation are related to their social capital, the critical elements of 
which are trust and reciprocity. These features are seen as fundamental because they enable the 
reduction of transaction costs (Arrow 1974), which, in the case of a syndicated loan, are strongly 
related to agency costs. Social capital features such as interaction, reciprocity, and trust are driven by 
social networks (Di Cagno and Sciubba 2010) and syndicated lending markets exhibit many social 
network features because they  serve as information  and capital networks  (Baum, Shipilov, and 
Rowley 2003; Baum, Rowley, and Shipilov 2004; Morrison and Wilhelm 2007). 
2.2 Network analysis of financial intermediation 
The linkages between financial institutions can be captured by using a network representation of 
financial systems. The general concept of a network is intuitive: it describes a collection of nodes and 
the links between them. The notion of nodes is fairly general: they may be individuals, firms or 
countries. A link between two nodes represents a direct relationship between them. 
Recently, Pistor (2009) provides an integrated approach looking at financial system from a 
global perspective. Network-finance is a critical institutional arrangement when there is great 
uncertainty about financing choices  for which inter-firm relations come in different forms and 
intensity. The concept of “strategic alliances” depicts a lose affiliation of firms and can be defined as 
“voluntary arrangements between firms involving exchange, sharing, or co-development of products, 
technologies or services” (Gulati 1998). According to this definition, any relation among independent 
entities that involves collaborative efforts without fully allocating control rights to one member in 
the alliance over another can be regarded as an alliance. Strategic alliances have become prominent 
in industries marred by uncertainties, such as banking. Networks resemble alliances in the sense that 
they are relatively loose configurations and typically lack a common governance structure. Networks 
understood as governance devices for cooperative relations can facilitate the expansion of economic 
activities. 
However, the literature on financial networks is still at an early stage (Allen and Babus 2008). 
Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) investigate information transfers in security markets and find that 
mutual fund portfolio managers place larger bets on firms they are connected with through their 
networks, and perform significantly better on these holdings relative to their non-connected 
holdings. These results suggest that social networks are an important mechanism for information 
flows.  Morrison and Wilhelm (2007) argue that investment banks exist because they create 
networks. These financial institutions mainly issue and underwrite securities and these activities 7 
 
require the development of two networks: an information network which allows the acquisition of 
information about the demand for an issue, and a liquidity network to provide the funds to purchase 
the securities. Indeed, Schnabel and Shin (2004) document how in the eighteenth century networks 
of merchant banks allowed capital accumulated in one part of Europe to be invested in far distant 
parts. These networks compensated for asymmetric information due to distance and also provided 
the necessary capital. 
Baum, Shipilov, and Rowley (2003) and Baum, Rowley, and Shipilov (2004)  are the rare 
authors to apply social network analysis to investigate Canadian bank syndicates.  They argue that 
the importance of understanding small world  structures  stems from their efficiency in moving 
information, experience, and other resources that enable organizational learning, adaptation and 
competitive advantage. External interdependence in the face of transaction costs is the most 
common explanation for the emergence of interfirm networks. This interdependence focuses on two 
main considerations: resource procurement (loan portfolio diversification and regulatory capital 
requirements limits) and uncertainty reduction (expertise and information of syndicate members). 
Hence, relations are built to share the costs and risks of undertaking large-scale projects, to develop 
existing markets or enter new ones, to pursue resource specialization, or to mitigate competition. 
Such objectives make firms interdependent with other firms that possess the capital, knowledge, 
complementary assets, and technical capabilities.  
Social network analysis is also applied to study venture capital (VC) finance. Kogut, Urso, and 
Walker (2007) provide an extensive analysis of the US VC syndication market over a 40 year period. 
They focus in particular on the dynamics and complexity of the network and show the rapid 
emergence of a national network of syndications. Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) examine the 
influence of VC networking when syndicating their portfolio company investment on the 
performance of VC firms in US. They find that better-networked  VC firms have better fund 
performance and that the portfolio companies of better networked VCs are more likely to survive 
subsequent financing and eventual exit.  This implies that one’s network position should be an 
important strategic consideration for an incumbent VC, while presenting a potential barrier to entry 
for new VCs. Finally, Meuleman et al. (2009) examine the influence of the network position of a 
private equity investor on the relationship between agency costs and the decision to syndicate on 
the UK private equity market. They find that the network position of an investor alleviates the 
negative impact of agency costs on the syndication decision. 
Overall, recent but scarce evidence shows that financial market networks play an important 
role in organizing and shaping transactions, reducing informational frictions, and ultimately affecting 
performances of actors (lenders and borrowers) on these markets. 8 
 
3. Data and methodology 
In this section we describe the data and the social network analysis methodology. We especially 
focus on the definition of a network and of its most important characteristics. 
3.1 Data 
Syndicated loans in Europe account for a third of the worldwide syndicated lending market. A recent 
loan of 20 billion USD for the French company EDF was ranked as 3
rd top deal (ThomsonFinancial 
2009), while the French bank BNP Paribas was among the top 10 bookrunners in terms of proceeds 
and underwritten volume. Furthermore, corporate financing through syndicated loans has gained in 
importance as it represents more than 10% of private credit in France. It is also worth noticing that 
bank syndicates lending to French companies exhibit some particular features as they are larger and 
less concentrated as compared to syndicates in the US or the UK (Godlewski 2009). These particular 
characteristics of the lending syndicates and the importance of syndicated loans in financing 
companies provide us with a pertinent empirical framework with respect to the aim of this article. 
Indeed, the presence of numerous lenders in the syndicates can signal an important level of social 
interactions which may serve as drivers of banks experience and reputation. This in turn may affect 
the syndicated lending market organization and development. 
Data on the French syndicated lending market, including detailed information on the loan 
agreement and bank syndicate characteristics, come from the Dealscan database (LPC, Reuters). This 
database is commonly used in empirical studies on syndicated lending (Champagne and Kryzanowski 
2007; Sufi 2007; Ivashina 2009; Ross 2010). We are able to identify the country, name, and role of 
436 lenders that have participated in 924 syndicated deals to 776 French companies from 1992 to 
2006. For each deal we have access to information on the loan amount, spread, maturity, guarantee, 
covenants, type, and purpose.  We also have information on the size, concentration and composition 
of the banks syndicate. 
  The main descriptive statistics and definitions of variables are provided in Table 1 while Table 
A (in appendix) displays the distribution of lenders’ countries in the sample. We remark that the 
average loan size is close to 2 billion USD with a 120 bps spread over the benchmark rate (such as 
Libor) and a maturity of almost 6 years. Loans are rarely guaranteed and only 1 out of 10 has financial 
covenants. More than 1 out of 3 loans are for debt repayment purpose while the types of loans are 
relatively balanced between term and revolving loans. 
We also observe that an average syndicate is composed of 14 lenders with more than 5 
arrangers. The presence of French banks is important as they represent 40% of an average syndicate. 
Apart from France, lenders come from 40 different countries but most of the remaining banks are 9 
 
from Germany, US, Japan, UK,  the  Netherlands, and Italy. The concentration of the loan shares 
retained by arrangers is rather low, just above 10%. The presence of reputable lenders (listed on the 
League Table by Reuters) is relatively important, equal to 34%. This figure drops to less than 15% if 
we focus on the reputable French lenders only. 
The most important industry sectors of the borrowers are Manufacturing (36%), Transport, 
Communication and Electricity (15%), Finance and Insurance (14%), Construction (7%), Wholesale 
Trade (7%), and Retail Trade (6%).  
3.2 Network definition and characteristics 
Information on banks’  participation in syndicated loans (or deals)  provides us with  an input to 
construct an “affiliation network”. In social network analysis, an affiliation network is a two-mode 
(bipartite) network with two types of nodes: actors linked with events in which they participate. In 
our case, actors are banks, events are syndicated deals and ties connect banks with the deals in 
which they participate. A hypothetical example of a bipartite network is shown in  Figure 1  (a). 
Connectivity in such a network is achieved through banks participating in several syndicates, such as 
lenders 4 and 8 in Figure 1 (a). 
Affiliation networks rarely become an object of study themselves but rather are used for 
constructing the corresponding social networks of  actors. To make a projection of the bipartite 
network of syndicated deals we follow Baum, Shipilov, and Rowley (2003) who re-construct banks’ 
network by accounting only for the relationships between lead - participant banks. Indeed, banks 
participating in the same syndicate typically have minimal contacts and  their interactions are 
primarily with lead banks
3
Further, we assume that ties between lead banks  and  other syndicate  members  do not 
disappear immediately, but remain active for several years. Hence, we use overlapping moving five-
year windows following Baum, Shipilov, and Rowley (2003). Thus, for each of the time windows we 
construct lenders’ networks considering only the syndicated loans arranged during these periods. We 
obtain 14 moving windows over the 1992-2006 time span, the first going from 1992-1995 and the 
last from 2002-2006. 
 (Rhodes 2004). 
An illustration of how a bipartite network can be projected to a one-mode network is 
displayed in Figure 1 (b). With this illustrative network, we can introduce several network measures 
needed to characterize a syndicated lending market. 
                                                            
3 We consider as lead banks syndicate members bearing the following titles:  administrative agent, agent, 
arranger, bookrunner, lead arranger, mandated arranger, senior arranger, underwriter, lead bank, joint 
arranger, managing agent, senior managing agent, syndication agent, co-agent, co-arranger, senior co-
arranger, sub-underwriter, co-lead arranger, co-syndication agent, co-underwriter. 10 
 
A path between a pair of lenders i and j is a sequence of lenders beginning with lender i and 
ending with lender j such that each lender in this sequence is unique and has ties with lenders 
preceding and following him in the sequence. Two lenders are connected if there is a path between 
them. The length of a path is the number of steps (“edges”) separating one from the other. Distance 
between two lenders is defined as the length of the shortest path (called “geodesic”) connecting 
them. Further, a connected component is a subset of nodes (lenders) such that any two nodes from 
this subset are connected. An isolate is a component which consists of a single node.  
For instance, on Figure 1 (b), lenders 1 and 10 are connected because there are several paths 
between them, e.g. through lenders 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8. The corresponding geodesic, or shortest path 
from 1 to 10, is (1 – 2 – 4 – 8 – 10) which has length 4. This network has two components {1÷10} and 
{11}. Lender 11 is an isolate as it is disconnected from the rest of the network. 
A generic feature of social and economic networks which has received much attention in the 
recent years is “small world” structure (Uzzi, Amaral, and Reed-Tsochas 2007). Most social networks 
are locally dense, but at the same time the social distances between the actors are relatively short. 
This property can be quantified using notions of clustering coefficient  and  average path length. 
Average path length is defined as the mean of the distances between all pairs of actors in a network 
and measures how close the actors in the network are. The shorter the average path length the 
faster and more efficient the information or resources may flow between two distant parts of the 
network. The clustering coefficient of an actor (lender) is the share of the actor’s neighbors who have 
direct contacts with each other.  
For instance, on Figure 1 (b) lender 2 has clustering coefficient equal to 0 because none of his 
contacts (lenders 1,3 and 4) have direct links with each other. Lender 6 has four contacts (lenders 4, 
5, 7 and 8) which makes 6 pairs of which only one pair (lenders 4 and 7) does not have direct contact, 
hence the clustering coefficient of lender 6 is 5/6.  
In a social network with high average clustering, “friends” of my “friends” are likely to be my 
“friends”, thus such a network is abundant with the closed triangle
4
Many real world networks are “small worlds”: they are sparse, have short average path 
length and are highly clustered. Watts and Strogatz (1998) showed how such structures may emerge 
when a network composed of tightly knit clusters only marginally linked with each other (thus having 
. Such network structures with 
many alternative paths through which the information or resources can flow between actors allow 
efficient social control alleviating the problems of opportunistic behavior and supporting reciprocity, 
trust and social norms (Coleman 1988). These are important characteristics to reduce informational 
frictions and agency costs in financial transactions such as syndicated loans. 
                                                            
4 a has a contact with b, b has a contact with c, but c also has contact with a closing the triangle abc. 11 
 
high clustering and long average path length) is transformed by randomly rewiring only a small 
fraction of links in the network. Their model is based on the fact that random rewiring creates 
shortcuts between otherwise distant parts of the network and while the average distance is highly 
responsive to the presence of shortcuts, the local structure (high clustering) is not. Consequently, if 
the share of the rewired links is small, a network has both short distances and high clustering. 
To examine whether an observed network is a small world,  one compares  it with a 
benchmark random network. Following Watts and Strogatz (1998), most empirical studies compare 
the average path length (La) and  clustering coefficient (Ca) of the observed networks with 
corresponding characteristics of an Erdos-Renyi (ER) random graph, where the same number of 
actors is randomly connected by the same number of links as in the observed network.  
While ER random graph may be a fair benchmark network for many social networks, in case 
the network was reconstructed from an affiliation network comparison with ER may be misleading 
(Newman, Strogatz, and Watts 2001). Indeed, making a projection of a two-mode network of teams 
and actors onto the set of actors, one has to assume certain structures of relationships within a 
team, thus teams will be represented by subgraphs of a fixed non-random structure. Therefore 
comparison of resulting one-mode network with a random graph where any link, including within-
team links, may lead to wrong conclusions (Uzzi, Amaral, and Reed-Tsochas 2007). 
To circumvent this problem, we construct benchmark random network as a projection of 
randomly rewired two-mode lender-deals network (rather than rewiring one-mode projections to 
obtain ER random graphs) as follows. First, we randomly reconnect deals and lenders in the observed 
network controlling that (a) each lender in the rewired network participates in the same number of 
deals as in the observed network, (b) each deal has the same number of lenders as in the observed 
network, and (c) each deal has the same number of arrangers as in the observed network
5
3.3 Individual characteristics within networks 
. The 
resulting random two-mode network is projected onto the set of lenders. For each of the 14 
observed moving time windows, we simulate 100 random networks and determine their structural 
properties. The average distance (Lr) and clustering (Cr)  averaged over 100 simulation runs are 
presented in columns Lr and Cr of the Table 2 along with the average distance (Ler) and clustering (Cer) 
of corresponding ER random graphs, as a robustness check. 
We now  turn to the definition of the  characteristics  of lenders’  individual positions within the 
syndicated lending network. We focus on several measures of actors’ importance: degree, closeness 
                                                            
5 Here we assume that the bank’s role (lead or participant) does not depend on the bank’s identity. 
Alternatively, one can also take into account that some banks become arrangers more often than others and 
control for the number of deals in which the given bank is an arranger. 12 
 
and betweenness centralities. These measures serve as proxies of lenders’ experience and reputation 
on the syndicated lending market. 
Actor’s degree or degree centrality, CD, can be defined as the number of the closest 
neighbors,  the set of actors with which the focal actor has direct links. Degree centrality 
characterizes the involvement of an actor in social relationships. It is a local measure, as it does not 
depend on the configuration of the whole network except the local neighborhood of the actor. 
Beside the simple definition of CD  commonly used in many empirical studies, there is also a 
standardized version of the degree centrality, which takes into account that the same number of 
relationships in a small network is not exactly the same as the same number of relationships in a 










where n is the size of the network (the number of actors in the network). Obviously, standardization 
has no effect on analysis if centrality scores are compared among the agents in the same network. 
Closeness centrality measures actor i's position in a network in terms of his proximity to 
other actors. It is defined as an inverse of the sum of the social distances between the actor and 










where  d(i,  j) is the distance between actor i  and  j. Closeness centrality conveys the intuitive 
understanding of the centre of a network. The closer the actor to the centre of the network, the 
higher his closeness centrality score
6
Finally, betweenness centrality measures how well the actor is positioned with respect to 
control over the flow of information or other resources in the network. Betweenness centrality of 
actor i can be defined as the ratio of the shortest paths between all pairs of actors in the network 
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where gi(j, j) is the total number of the shortest paths between actors j and k and g(j, j) is the total 
number of the shortest paths between actors j and k.  
                                                            
6 Imagine a star network where one node occupies the centre to which all other (n-1) actors are connected and 
no ties exist between peripheral actors (e.g. a deal with one lead bank and (n-1) participant banks). Then 
closeness centrality of the star is 1, while for the other actors closeness centrality is 1/(2n-3). 13 
 
4. Results 
We present and discuss in this section the results on the organization and structure of the French 
syndicated lending network and the influence of lenders’ individual network characteristics on the 
cost of bank loans for borrowers. 
4.1 Small world 
Results for the French syndicated lending network for each of the 14 overlapping time windows are 
displayed in Table 2. We first remark that as raising capital through syndicated loans became more 
and more important over the period under investigation, the number of deals (column deals) has 
been continuously increasing as well as the number of lenders (column lenders) albeit at a lower rate 
for the last indicator. We observe that there were 82 deals and 166 lenders involved during time 
window 1 and 494 deals and 347 lenders involved during time window 14. Peaks are observed for 
window 13 (years 2002-2006) with 577 deals and 392 lenders. Due to the increased number of deals 
and involved lenders, the number of links (column links) has been multiplied by 10, starting at 679 
during time window 1 to reach 6634 during time window 14, for a peak in window 13 with 8151 links.  
  Regarding network characteristics, a remarkable feature of the French syndicated lending 
network is its high connectedness as isolates (column isolates) comprise less than 5% of all lenders 
for most periods. Furthermore, the largest connected component (LC) consists of more than 90% of 
all lenders. Therefore when studying the properties of the network we can focus solely on the largest 
component without loss of information. 
To see how the average distance and clustering of the actual networks (La and Ca) differ from 
the corresponding characteristics of the benchmark random networks  constructed with the 
simulation (Lr and Cr), we calculate LL ratio (La / Lr) and CC ratio (Ca / Cr). In the model of Watts and 
Strogatz (1998) the small worlds emerge when CC ratio is many times greater than 1, while LL ratio is 
close to 1. To quantify the small world characteristics of our networks, we also calculate the “small 
world ratio” SW = CC / LL (Davis, Yoo, and Baker 2003; Uzzi and Spiro 2005). 
We first discuss results obtained with the simulated benchmark random network method, to 
comment later on results obtained with the ER method. In our network, LL ratio stays close to 1 for 
all periods. However, although the CC ratio is above 1 for most of the periods, it is generally not very 
different from 1. The SW is relatively low in comparison with the values of Watts and Strogatz (1998) 
model. However, it should be emphasized that the choice of the benchmark random graph may in 
general imply different values of the SW at the small world phase transition. 
Although the relatively small values of SW ratio do not allow us to unambiguously assert that 
the French syndicated lending network has small world properties, the dynamics of the CC, LL  and 14 
 
SW  ratios displayed in Figure 2 (A) clearly indicates that the network becomes “small worldish” over 
time. Indeed, as the network expands the rate at which the normalized clustering (CC ratio) grows 
outpaces the growth of the normalized average distance (LL ratio), therefore SW as the ratio of the 
two is growing over time. At the beginning of the observation both CC ratio and LL ratio are below 1. 
The fact that the clustering and distances in the observed network are lower than in a corresponding 
random network stems from certain regularities in the actual network.  
A subgraph representing a single deal has a star-like structure, where the centre is occupied 
by lead banks and the “rays” are participant banks (see Figure 1 (b): separate deals are shown by red 
circles). Since the benchmark random graphs preserve the structure of deals (the number of 
participants and the number of lead banks), the random networks consist of the identical set of star-
like subgraphs assembled in various ways. Indeed, the number of deals for each of the lenders was 
kept the same as in the actual network. The structural properties of the assembled networks depend 
on the identities of the active banks which connect the deals, more precisely on the roles played by 
active banks in the respective syndicates, i.e. whether they are ordinary participants or lead banks.  
When deals are connected via an ordinary participant of the two deals, the resulting network 
will have longer social distances and lower clustering than if the deals were connected via a lead 
bank. In the former case,  the distance between participants  of the two deals (excluding the 
connecting participant) is 4, while in the latter it is 2. As for clustering, it should first be noticed that 
when two deals are connected, only clustering coefficients of all but the connecting bank stay the 
same as they would if the two deals were disconnected. The change in the clustering coefficient of 
the connector depends on the number of direct links it has in the two deals. The higher it is, the 
more “open triangles” the resulting network has and the less is the clustering. Since lead banks have 
more connections, networks where deals are connected via leaders have lower clustering.   
Since in the simulations we control for the number of deals in which each lender participates, 
but not for the number of deals in which it has been lead bank, the fact that clustering and average 
path length in the actual networks are lower than in the random benchmark networks suggests that 
in the actual networks subgraphs corresponding to the deals are disproportionally more likely (in 
comparison with the pure chance) to be connected through lead banks than through participant 
banks. That may happen when there is a core of banks specializing  in  syndicated loans, while 
participant banks are less likely to participate in many deals with different arrangers
7
By contrast, at the end of the observation period, both CC and LL ratios are above 1 pointing 
to the fact that now the network is more likely to be connected by the participants. This brings us 
back to the idea of small worlds. A network connected by lead banks is likely to be highly centralized 
.  
                                                            
7 For instance, three large banks (JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and Citigroup) control over half of the U.S. 
commercial loan market by volume through the syndication process (Ross 2010). 15 
 
with a dense core occupied by leaders and periphery consisting of participant banks. By contrast, a 
network where connections are done through participants may be less centralized and the core may 
have several dense parts populated by lead banks which are connected through participant banks. In 
this respect participant banks may play a similar role as the “shortcuts” in Watts and Strogatz (1998) 
model. 
To complete the analysis, let us compare our results with what we would have found had we 
used ER random graphs as benchmark. The last three columns of Table 2 report average distance 
(Ler), clustering coefficient (Cer) and small world ratio (SWer) for ER random graphs with the number of 
banks and links between them as in the observed networks. First,  ER random networks are 
significantly less clustered (almost the order of the magnitude) than the observed networks which 
owes to the fact that the ER does not account for the observed networks being projections of two-
mode networks. Average distances, however, are not very different from  the distances in the 
observed network. As a result,  the small world ratio,  mostly driven by the ratio of clustering 
coefficients, is a fairly large number above 10. Thus had we used ER as a benchmark we might have 
unambiguously concluded that the  French syndicated network  is a small world.  However,  our 
analysis demonstrates that the matter is more subtle here. Our results suggest that the syndication 
network becomes “small worldish” with time (see the dynamics of the small world ratio at Figure 2 
(A)). The dynamics of CC, LL and SW ratios based on ER random graph presented at Figure 2 (B) does 
not show any particular pattern. 
Overall, we can claim that the dynamics of the French syndicated lending market tends to 
confirm that over time the networks of lenders become small worlds in the sense of Watts (2003). 
This particular feature has important implications for the flows of information between lenders and 
their level of social capital which ultimately influences lenders’ experience and reputation. This in 
turn can affect informational frictions and agency costs of syndication, and impact the borrowing 
costs. 
4.2 Impact of individual network characteristics on loan spread 
We investigate the  influence of individual network characteristics of banks syndicating loans for 
French  borrowers on  the  loan spread. The latter is the main loan contract characteristic which 
influences the cost of debt and ultimately the company cost of capital. We  claim that greater 
centrality  of syndicate members  indicates a higher  level of social capital acquired through 
interaction, reciprocity, and trust. This in turn increases their experience and reputation allowing the 
mitigation of informational frictions within the syndicate and affecting borrowing costs.  
We perform  series of regressions of the loan spread over the benchmark rate (such as 
Euribor or Libor) on the syndicate average lenders’ betweenness, closeness and degree centralities. 16 
 
Betweenness is a measure of the lender’s position in the network and his control over network flows. 
This particular feature is the most important in mitigating information asymmetries because it takes 
the network’s intermediation position of the lender into account. Closeness measures the lender’s 
distance to the network center, i.e. the closer a lender is to the network center, the better his access 
to information and resources flows. Degree is a local measure of lender’s involvement in social 
relationships. Univariate statistics for these measures are displayed in Table 1. 
We evaluate the impact of each measure of centrality on the loan spread separately using six 
different specifications.  We employ OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the syndicated 
loan level
8.  The benchmark specification controls for the  main loan characteristics such as loan 
amount, maturity, the presence of guarantors and covenants, following notably Focarelli, Pozzolo, 
and Casolaro (2008) and Ivashina (2009)
9. Each subsequent specification includes separately a 
specific syndicate characteristic: the number of lenders, the percentage of local lenders, syndicated 
loan concentration, the percentage of league table lenders and local league table lenders
10
 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = 𝑓(𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠,𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) 
. These 
specifications aim at controlling for other syndicate characteristics that may mitigate informational 
frictions and agency costs of syndication, such as the presence of better informed local lenders, more 
concentrated holdings of the loan which reduce moral hazard, or banks listed on League Tables. The 
estimated equation can be summarized as follows: 
 
Results are displayed in Tables 3, 4, and 5 for betweenness, closeness, and degree centrality 
measures respectively. A correlation matrix for all variables is provided in Table B (in appendix). We 
first remark a satisfactory statistical quality of the regressions as the R² is close to 50% and the 
Fischer statistic is always significant for every specification in Tables 3 to 5. Next we observe that all 
three syndicate centrality measures exhibit significant and negative coefficients in a vast majority of 
specifications
11
                                                            
8 Similar results are obtained when clustering at the borrower or lender level. 
. The strongest results are obtained for the betweenness centrality measure as its 
coefficient is always negative and significant in Table 3. Hence, in 8 cases out of 12 we are able to 
9 Some of the loan characteristics can be endogenous such as the loan spread and amount. Unfortunately, we 
do not have enough information to build instrumental variables to perform multi stage regressions. However, 
to check if potential endogeneity could drive the results, we have also performed separate regressions adding 
step by step one loan variable to the benchmark specification, as well as trying different combinations of the 
loan characteristics variables. This procedure does not alter the coefficients of the syndicate centrality 
measures or the coefficients of other loan variables. 
10 Although not always statistically correlated, these syndicate characteristics are expected to be economically 
related therefore we do not include them all at the same time in a single specification. Sample size is strongly 
reduced for regressions with the Syndication concentration variable because of missing information regarding 
the retained shares of the loan by arrangers. 
11 Exceptions are models (2.4), (2.5), (2.6), and (3.5). 17 
 
validate the benefit of a central syndicate in funding a loan in terms of reduced loan spread and thus 
borrowing costs. In other words, borrowers can gain from reduced loan spreads when they are 
funded by syndicates composed of lenders that are more central on the syndicated lending market. 
Hence, lenders’ social capital matters for loan syndication as the presence of such experienced and 
reputable lenders having access to greater amount and flows of information and resources serves as 
a device mitigating informational frictions and agency costs related to loan syndication. This is shown 
to be beneficial for the borrowers in terms of a reduced loan price. 
  We further notice interesting effects stemming from other syndicate characteristics that may 
reduce information asymmetry and agency problems. First, we remark that the presence of local 
lenders or a concentrated syndicate do not have any significant influence on the loan spread or on 
the impact of syndicate centrality on the loan spread. The only two syndicate features that have a 
significant and negative influence on the borrowing costs are the presence of league table lenders 
and local league table lenders. This result is coherent with the signaling role of lead bank reputation 
in reducing the costs of information asymmetries. Furthermore, we observe that in these cases, the 
coefficients of the centrality measures are reduced in magnitude, especially for the betweenness 
measure. However, their significance is not altered, except for the closeness and degree centrality 
measures
12
  Finally, we remark that among loan characteristics, only loan amount and maturity bear 
significant coefficients which remain robust across most of  the specifications. Loan size has a 
negative impact on loan spread for economies of scale reasons while longer maturities are positively 
related to borrowing costs because of greater risk. 
. Hence, league table reputation appears as an important syndicate feature to reduce 
loan spread but not enough to vanish away the more important effect of syndicate betweenness 
centrality.  
  We also perform robustness checks of our results by using the same specifications but on 
sub-samples characterized by the presence of local lenders only, large loans, long maturities, large 
syndicates, concentrated syndicates, numerous league table lenders and local league table lenders.  
The classification of deals is done on the basis of the median of the relevant variable. Hence, we aim 
to isolate syndicated deals that are more or less informational  problematic.  For instance, the 
exclusive presence of (better informed) local lenders or numerous league table banks should reduce 
information asymmetry and agency costs, so that the presence of central lenders in the syndicate 
should play a weaker role.  On the contrary, longer maturities or concentrated syndicates being 
                                                            
12 In these cases, league table lenders’ presence in the syndicate appears to be more important for loan pricing 
than banks’ distance to the centre of the network or the local involvement in the network. We remind that 
closeness and degree measures are statistically correlated with league table variables. 
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associated with riskier deals with greater moral hazard problems, we expect syndicate centrality to 
play a more important role.  
Results are displayed in Table 6
13
  Overall, we remark that the main results remain robust in the sense that most centrality 
measures remain significant and negative, except for two specifications with closeness centrality and 
one specification with degree centrality. Regarding more informationally problematic deals (large 
loans, long maturities, large and concentrated syndicates), we observe that for each of the three 
syndicate centrality measures, coefficients are larger than to the main specifications in Tables 3, 4, 
and 5. The exceptions concern the Large syndicates specification for which coefficients are lower or 
not significant. We can interpret this result by the fact that larger syndicates could also signal better 
quality deals with less informational frictions and agency problems which allow the organization of  a 
syndicate with more members (Lee and Mullineaux 2004; Sufi 2007). In such a case, the importance 
of experienced, reputable and central lenders appears to be less important.  
. The first four columns correspond to sub-samples where 
information problems are expected to be severe. Large and complex loans imply more agency costs 
and coordination problems, while longer maturities are usually associated with greater risk. Larger 
syndicates are usually funding larger, more complex and riskier loans and coordination problems are 
more likely in such syndicates, while greater syndicate concentration is related to more severe moral 
hazard problems. The last three columns correspond to deals which are expected to have less 
information problems because of the exclusive presence of local lenders and of league table banks. 
When turning to deals where informational frictions should be less problematic (many local 
lenders and numerous league table banks), we remark that evidence is more mixed. Coefficients for 
syndicate centrality measures are lower or even not significant for deals funded exclusively by French 
banks. Such deals leave less room for informational frictions and agency problems because of the 
presence of better informed local lenders thus the importance of central lenders is less of an issue. 
However, evidence is less clear-cut for deals funded by numerous league table lenders. Overall, it 
seems that syndicate centrality matters, even very much, for such deals. We can explain this result by 
stating that the probability of having central syndicate members increases with the presence of 
league table banks.  Indeed, centrality measures and league table variables are significantly 
correlated and they are larger for the Many league table sub-sample than the average values for the 
whole sample. 
                                                            
13 We do not display coefficients for main loan characteristics to save space. These coefficients remain robust 
and exhibit similar signs and significance levels as in tables 3, 4, and 5. 19 
 
5. Conclusion 
Using a large sample of almost 1000 syndicated loans for French companies over a long period (1992-
2006), we first analyze the small world properties of the French syndicated lending market. A small 
world is a locally dense social network where social distances between actors are short. Such 
network improves market’s efficiency as it allows larger information and resources flows as well as 
actors’ social capital, experience and reputation. We find that the dynamics of the French syndicated 
lending market tends to support that the networks of lenders become small worlds over time in the 
sense of Watts (2003). Hence, we provide additional evidence on the small world characteristics of 
syndicated lending markets, following the work of Baum, Shipilov, and Rowley (2003) and Baum, 
Rowley, and Shipilov (2004) who found that the Canadian syndicated lending market also exhibit 
small world features. 
We  then  investigate  the impact of the lenders’ individual  network characteristics on 
borrower wealth by evaluating the sensitivity of loan pricing to lenders’ experience and reputation 
which we proxy using network centrality measures of banks. We rely on three most widely used 
centrality measures: betweenness, closeness and degree, each measuring a different aspect of the 
lender’s network position. Regressions of the  loan spread on these experience and reputation 
proxies show that borrowers can gain from reduced loan pricing when they are funded by syndicates 
composed of lenders that are more central on the syndicated lending market. In particular, lenders’ 
betweenness centrality appears to be a crucial characteristic for borrowing costs reduction. Hence, 
the presence of such experienced and reputable lenders having access to greater amounts and flows 
of information and resources serves as a device mitigating informational frictions and agency costs 
related to loan syndication. These results provide additional evidence on the role of experience and 
reputation on the syndicated lending market, following notably Panyagometh and Roberts (2010) 
and Ross (2010). 
  Overall, the organization of the syndicated lending market matters for successful bank loan 
syndication. In particular, its capacity to enhance lenders’ interaction, reciprocity, trust, experience, 
and reputation has important implications for mitigating information costs. This in turn contributes 
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Figure 1 Constructing a network of lenders 
Deals (A, B, C, D) are shown in black, lead arrangers (2, 5, 6, and 8) in gray, other participants in white.  
(a) Bipartite network of syndicated deals (A, B, C) and lenders (1 to 10). Lender 2 is the leader in deal A, lenders 5, 6, and 8 
are leaders in deal B, and deal C is led by bank 8.  
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(A)  Dynamics using simulated random network method 
 
 
(B)  Dynamics using Erdos-Renyi random network method 
 
Figure 2 Dynamics of the average distance (LL), clustering (CC) and small-world ratio (SW) 
CC and CCer: ratios of Ca / Cr and Ca / Cer respectively. LL and LLer: ratios of La / Lr and La / Ler. SW and SWer: 
small world ratios defined as CC / LL and CCer / LLer respectively. Ca: clustering of the actual network. La: average 
distance of the actual network. Cr  and Cer: clustering of the simulated and Erdos-Renyi random networks 
respectively. Lr and Ler: average distance of the simulated and Erdos-Renyi random networks respectively.  

























Table 1 Description and univariate descriptive statistics for main syndicate, loan, and lenders’ individual network 
characteristics 
This table provides the description and main statistics for syndicate, loan, and lender’s individual network characteristics in 
the sample. 
Variables  Description  Mean  Std. dev. 
Spread  Loan spread in bps over benchmark rate  120.2581  119.4219 
Loan amount  Loan amount in millions $  1890.0000  3160.0000 
Maturity  Loan maturity in months  70.6261  36.6228 
Guarantors  =1 if guarantors are present  0.0645  0.2456 
Covenants  =1 if financial covenants are present  0.1044  0.3058 
Number of arrangers  Number of arrangers in the syndicate  5.3465  5.4026 
Number of lenders  Number of lenders in the syndicate  14.3789  10.5990 
Local lenders  % of French lenders in the syndicate  0.4097  0.2909 
Syndicate concentration  Average % of the loan held by arrangers in the syndicate  0.1178  0.1422 
League table  % of league tables lenders in the syndicate  0.3400  0.2129 
League table (local)  % of league table French lenders in the syndicate  0.1487  0.1734 
Corporate purpose  =1 if loan purpose is corporate purpose  0.1806  0.3847 
Debt repay purpose  =1 if loan purpose is debt repayment  0.3522  0.4777 
LBO purpose  =1 if loan purpose is LBO  0.1659  0.3720 
Term loan  =1 if loan is a term loan  0.3161  0.4649 
Revolving loan  =1 if loan is a revolving loan  0.4048  0.4909 
Libor  =1 if loan benchmark rate is Libor  0.2839  0.4509 
Betweenness  Average lenders’ betweenness by syndicate  0.0155  0.0080 
Closeness  Average lender’s closeness by syndicate  0.5218  0.0316 
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Table 2 Syndicated lending network characteristics 
This table displays network characteristics for the French syndicated lending market over the period 1992-2006. The first column displays the overlapping moving time 
windows while the second and third columns indicate the first and last year of the period under investigation. Each of the 14 overlapping periods contains 5 years of 
observations (except for the periods 1, 13, and 14). Columns 4 to 7 display the number of syndicated deals, the number of different lenders involved, the number of links 
between lenders, and the number of isolated lenders respectively. Columns 8 to 10 display the largest component (LC), the clustering of the actual network (Ca), and the 
average distance of the actual network (La). Columns 11 to 13 display the clustering of the simulated random network (Cr), the average distance of the simulated random 
network (Lr), and the small world ratio  (SW) defined as CC / LL. Columns 14 to 16 display the clustering of the Erdos-Renyi random network (Cer), the average distance of 




start  end  #deals  #lenders  #links  #isolates  LC  Ca  La  Cr  Lr   SW   Cer  Ler   SWer 
1  1992  1995  82  166  679  7  159  0,2031  2,363  0,2635  2,5804  0,8415  0,0525  2,627  6,3334 
2  1992  1996  137  209  907  12  197  0,2278  2,5595  0,2688  2,6178  0,8666  0,0444  2,6747  10,2846 
3  1992  1997  167  221  1104  15  206  0,312  2,5138  0,3239  2,58  0,9885  0,0476  2,5713  17,0909 
4  1993  1998  214  258  1404  19  234  0,3319  2,5614  0,325  2,5699  1,0247  0,0443  2,566  21,9144 
5  1994  1999  265  283  2082  13  265  0,3947  2,493  0,3666  2,4483  1,0573  0,0552  2,37  20,5085 
6  1995  2000  375  363  4467  10  345  0,4096  2,327  0,3978  2,2446  0,9933  0,0721  2,1078  13,8693 
7  1996  2001  415  356  6143  15  338  0,4879  2,2473  0,4474  2,1064  1,022  0,0972  1,934  11,2116 
8  1997  2002  427  352  5851  16  331  0,5002  2,2685  0,4436  2,1169  1,0523  0,0947  1,9438  12,2984 
9  1998  2003  480  367  6319  16  351  0,4656  2,1345  0,4249  2,0995  1,0779  0,0941  1,9412  11,4697 
10  1999  2004  510  391  7745  16  375  0,467  2,1086  0,4298  2,0518  1,0573  0,1016  1,9143  10,0196 
11  2000  2005  490  387  7683  18  369  0,5038  2,1127  0,4294  2,0517  1,1394  0,1029  1,912  11,3461 
12  2001  2006  563  377  7465  16  361  0,5322  2,1285  0,4302  2,0079  1,1671  0,1054  1,9083  11,9783 
13  2002  2006  577  392  8151  15  375  0,5186  2,0999  0,428  1,9994  1,1535  0,1062  1,9041  11,3558 






Table 3 Influence of syndicate betweenness centrality on loan spread 
This table provides the results of OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the loan level. The 
dependent variable is the logarithm of the loan spread (bps) over the benchmark rate. The level of 
observation is lender-tranche. All regressions include loan purpose dummies (Corporate, Debt repay, 
and LBO), type of loan dummies (Term and Revolving), Libor dummy, and dummies for industrial sectors 
and years. Lenders fixed effects takes main lender’s countries into account through dummies for lenders 
from France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, UK, and US. ***, **, * correspond to coefficients statistically 
different from 0 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level. All variables are described in table 1. 
Variables  Model 1.1  Model 1.2  Model 1.3  Model 1.4  Model 1.5  Model 1.6 
Betweenness   -24.220***  -23.438***  -23.750***  -18.381**  -1.866***  -2.405*** 
   (5.795)  (5.462)  (5.738)  (8.065)  (0.651)  (0.707) 
Loan amount  -0.220***  -0.242***  -0.226***  -0.205***  -0.221***  -0.243*** 
   (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.054)  (0.037)  (0.038) 
Maturity  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.000  0.003***  0.003*** 
   (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Guarantors  -0.237  -0.233  -0.242  -0.507*  -0.185  -0.193 
   (0.168)  (0.158)  (0.169)  (0.269)  (0.177)  (0.168) 
Covenants  -0.139  -0.192  -0.140  -0.435**  -0.107  -0.109 
   (0.153)  (0.144)  (0.154)  (0.193)  (0.153)  (0.158) 
Number of 
lenders 
  0.010*         
     (0.005)         
Local lenders      -0.114       
       (0.121)       
Syndicate 
concentration 
      0.274     
         (0.408)     
League table          -0.600***   
           (0.207)   
League table 
(local) 
          -0.611*** 
             (0.186) 
Intercept  8.775***  9.153***  8.949***  9.083***  8.759***  9.158*** 
   (0.736)  (0.774)  (0.771)  (1.051)  (0.724)  (0.772) 
Lender fixed 
effects 
Yes  No  No  No  No  No 
N. obs.  12376  12367  12376  6191  12376  12376 
R²  0.529  0.533  0.529  0.503  0.520  0.517 
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Table 4 Influence of syndicate closeness centrality on loan spread 
This table provides the results of OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the loan level. The 
dependent variable is the logarithm of the loan spread (bps) over the benchmark rate. The level of observation 
is lender-tranche. All regressions include loan purpose dummies (Corporate, Debt repay, and LBO), type of loan 
dummies (Term and Revolving), Libor dummy, and dummies for industrial sectors and years. Lenders fixed 
effects takes main lender’s countries into account through dummies for lenders from France, Germany, Japan, 
Netherlands, UK, and US. ***, **, * correspond to coefficients statistically different from 0 at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% confidence level. All variables are described in table 1. 
Variables  Model 2.1  Model 2.2  Model 2.3  Model 2.4  Model 2.5  Model 2.6 
Closeness  -3.1359**  -3.1626**  -3.0618**  -2.8145  -1.1202  -2.2503 
   (1.4858)  (1.4301)  (1.4684)  (1.9891)  (1.8355)  (1.5748) 
Loan amount  -0.2222***  -0.2461***  -0.2293***  -0.2029***  -0.2227***  -0.2407*** 
   (0.0379)  (0.0392)  (0.0397)  (0.0556)  (0.0376)  (0.0397) 
Maturity  0.0033***  0.0032***  0.0033***  0.0006  0.0032***  0.0033*** 
   (0.0011)  (0.0009)  (0.0010)  (0.0013)  (0.0011)  (0.0010) 
Guarantors  -0.2222  -0.2177  -0.2264  -0.5111*  -0.1993  -0.2120 
   (0.1696)  (0.1578)  (0.1704)  (0.2680)  (0.1771)  (0.1672) 
Covenants  -0.1276  -0.1867  -0.1292  -0.4166**  -0.1106  -0.1181 
   (0.1582)  (0.1480)  (0.1598)  (0.1963)  (0.1541)  (0.1582) 
Number of 
lenders 
  0.0119*         
     (0.0062)         
Local lenders      -0.1450       
       (0.1236)       
Syndicate 
concentration 
      0.2648     
         (0.4092)     
League table          -0.5693**   
           (0.2541)   
Local league 
table 
          -0.5234** 
             (0.2056) 
   (0.1210)  (0.1135)  (0.1217)  (0.1980)  (0.1205)  (0.1200) 
Intercept  10.0758***  10.4952***  10.2462***  10.1813***  9.2246***  10.1177*** 
   (0.9389)  (0.9965)  (0.9653)  (1.3249)  (1.0542)  (0.9394) 
Lender fixed 
effects 
Yes  No  No  No  No  No 
N. obs.  12376  12367  12376  6191  12376  12376 
R²  0.5156  0.5209  0.5155  0.4969  0.5209  0.5185 
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Table 5 Influence of syndicate degree centrality on loan spread 
This table provides the results of OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the loan level. The level of 
observation is lender-tranche. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the loan spread (bps) over the benchmark 
rate. All regressions include loan purpose dummies (Corporate, Debt repay, and LBO), type of loan dummies (Term and 
Revolving), Libor dummy, and dummies for industrial sectors and years. Lenders fixed effects takes main lender’s 
countries into account through dummies for lenders from France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, UK, and US. ***, **, * 
correspond to coefficients statistically different from 0 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level. All variables are 
described in table 1. 
Variables  Model 3.1  Model 3.2  Model 3.3  Model 3.4  Model 3.5  Model 3.6 
Degree  -0.0014**  -0.0014**  -0.0014**  -0.0012*  -0.0007  -0.0011* 
   (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0007)  (0.0008)  (0.0006) 
Loan amount  -0.2186***  -0.2421***  -0.2258***  -0.2006***  -0.2208***  -0.2361*** 
   (0.0382)  (0.0395)  (0.0399)  (0.0555)  (0.0379)  (0.0403) 
Maturity  0.0031***  0.0031***  0.0032***  0.0005  0.0032***  0.0033*** 
   (0.0010)  (0.0009)  (0.0010)  (0.0013)  (0.0010)  (0.0010) 
Guarantors  -0.2379  -0.2336  -0.2426  -0.5072*  -0.2100  -0.2257 
   (0.1698)  (0.1579)  (0.1704)  (0.2676)  (0.1761)  (0.1679) 
Covenants  -0.1404  -0.1983  -0.1420  -0.4340**  -0.1185  -0.1287 
   (0.1573)  (0.1472)  (0.1589)  (0.1958)  (0.1541)  (0.1578) 
Number of lenders    0.0117*         
     (0.0061)         
Local lenders      -0.1459       
       (0.1234)       
Syndicate concentration        0.2548     
         (0.4088)     
League table          -0.5178*   
           (0.2682)   
Local league table            -0.4749** 
             (0.2137) 
Intercept  8.6073***  9.0085***  8.8169***  8.8981***  8.6964***  9.0248*** 
   (0.7358)  (0.7751)  (0.7720)  (1.0671)  (0.7352)  (0.7903) 
Lender fixed effects  Yes  No  No  No  No  No 
N. obs.  12376  12367  12376  6191  12376  12376 
R²  0.5176  0.5227  0.5175  0.4988  0.5215  0.5197 
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Table 6 Robustness checks for the influence of syndicate centrality measures on loan spread 
This table provides the results of OLS regressions with standard errors clustered at the loan level. The dependent variable is the logarithm of 
the loan spread (bps) over the benchmark rate. The level of observation is lender-tranche. All regressions include loan main characteristics 
(Loan amount, Maturity, Guarantors, Covenants), loan purpose dummies (Corporate, Debt repay, and LBO), type of loan dummies (Term and 
Revolving), Libor dummy, and dummies for industrial sectors and years. The first regression is for large loans (loan amount greater than sample 
median:  662.7 millions $).  The second  regression is for long maturities (maturities greater than sample median: 61 months).  The third 
regression is for concentrated syndicates (% of loan held by arrangers greater than sample median: 0.065). The fourth regression is for large 
syndicates (number of lenders greater than sample median: 13). The fifht regression is for loans funded by French lenders only. The sixth 
regression is for syndicates with many league table lenders (% of league table lenders greater than sample median: 0.29). The seventh 
regression is for syndication with many local league table lenders (% of French league table lenders greater than sample median: 0.09). ***, **, 
* correspond to coefficients statistically different from 0 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence level. All variables are described in table 1. 








French lenders only  Many league table  Many league  
table (local) 
Betweenness  -28.1563***  -25.4679***  -20.3959**  -28.1036***  -19.8812***  -1.3902**  -2.8697*** 
   (10.3210)  (6.7935)  (9.8816)  (8.3596)  (5.3377)  (0.5843)  (0.7856) 
N. obs.  6303  6338  6592  2907  4982  6455  6306 
R²  0.5573  0.7078  0.5717  0.5161  0.5159  0.6330  0.5851 
F  24.0023  27.3561  27.5264  13.1325  24.3822  29.4552  33.4562 
Closeness  -5.7443***  -5.3414***  -0.5550  -5.8459***  -2.1173  -3.0566*  -3.1368* 
  (2.1960)  (1.5715)  (2.6722)  (2.0086)  (1.4943)  (1.7610)  (1.8798) 
N. obs.  6303  6338  6592  2907  4982  6455  6306 
R²  0.5502  0.7030  0.5640  0.5033  0.5040  0.6371  0.6024 
F  22.8317  28.5250  25.3508  13.8550  23.8497  29.3336  31.1840 
Degree  -0.0020**  -0.0023***  -0.0001  -0.0024***  -0.0012**  -0.0018***  -0.0015** 
  (0.0008)  (0.0006)  (0.0009)  (0.0008)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0008) 
N. obs.  6303  6338  6592  2907  4982  6455  6306 
R²  0.5509  0.7048  0.5640  0.5083  0.5066  0.6408  0.6048 
















Table A List of lenders’ countries 
Lender country  Obs.  Percent 
Argentina  8  0,05 
Australia  101  0,59 
Austria  74  0,43 
Bahrain  7  0,04 
Belgium  450  2,63 
Brazil  3  0,02 
Canada  304  1,78 
Chile  1  0,01 
China  37  0,22 
Denmark  39  0,23 
Egypt  7  0,04 
Finland  1  0,01 
France  6 011  35,17 
Germany  2 693  15,76 
Hong Kong  396  2,32 
Iceland  10  0,06 
India  1  0,01 
Ireland  200  1,17 
Israel  4  0,02 
Italy  886  5,18 
Japan  1 221  7,14 
Jordan  10  0,06 
Kuwait  8  0,05 
Luxembourg  117  0,68 
Morocco  6  0,04 
Netherlands  1 112  6,51 
Norway  15  0,09 
Poland  2  0,01 
Portugal  43  0,25 
Romania  6  0,04 
Saudi Arabia  5  0,03 
Singapore  13  0,08 
South Africa  1  0,01 
Spain  497  2,91 
Sweden  21  0,12 
Switzerland  220  1,29 
Tunisia  2  0,01 
USA  1 372  8,03 
United Arab Emirates  7  0,04 






Table B Correlation matrix 
* indicates a coefficient statistically different from 0 at the 10% confidence level. 
Variables  Betweenness  Closeness  Degree  Spread  Loan  
amount 






League table  League table  
(local) 
Betweenness  1.0000                          
Closeness  0.6462*  1.0000                        
Degree  0.6303*  0.8879*  1.0000                      
Spread  -0.2417*  -0.1395*  -0.1338*  1.0000                    
Loan amount  0.1266*  0.2603*  0.3581*  -0.3148*  1.0000                  
Maturity  -0.0852*  -0.0659*  -0.0697*  0.2993*  0.0200*  1.0000                
Guarantors  -0.0992*  -0.0869*  -0.1308*  0.0538*  -0.0777*  0.0768*  1.0000              
Covenants  -0.0124  -0.0113  -0.0346*  -0.0561*  0.0713*  -0.0237*  -0.0772*  1.0000            
Number of lenders  -0.0371*  0.1363*  0.1875*  -0.1806*  0.5194*  0.0601*  -0.0918*  0.2272*  1.0000          
Local lenders  0.0627*  0.0347*  0.0054  0.1546*  -0.3002*  0.0561*  -0.0126   -0.0423*  -0.2869*  1.0000        
Syndicate concentration  -0.0914*  -0.1098*  -0.1622*  0.1439*  -0.1270*  0.1830*  -0.0369*  0.1249*  -0.3009*  0.1988*  1.0000      
League table  0.5327*  0.4734*  0.5314*  -0.1069*  0.0297*  -0.0311*  -0.0239*  0.0348*  -0.0355*  0.0716*  -0.0240*  1.0000    
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